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Surprised by Law 
Emily Fowler Hartigan* 
The AALS' convention this past month provided one of 
those alleged rarities, a genuinely engaging panel discussion. 
Surroundmg the key figure of Michael Sandel, Harvard 
philosopher of community and the "encumbered self," were 
several notable commentators. To my taste, the most 
interesting exchange was between sandel, a passionate and 
polished lecturer, and a ruddy, self-designatedly overweight 
federal judge, Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit. Sandel, 
wiry, intense, searingly concise, delivered his defense of an 
ethics of appreciation which goes beyond mere toleration. 
Consistent with his attacks on Kantian notions of the self, 
Sandel argued for honor, not merely dignity, for persons. 
Dignity focuses on the capacity to choose ends, while honor 
attaches to the role, the behavior of persons in the world. In  
Sandel's scheme of "judgmental pluralism" we are to make 
judgments about the moral worth of the practices which legal 
rights are fashioned to protect. One key practice which Sandel 
honors is that of those claimed in advance by a God Who sets a 
Sabbath. 
Reinhardt was nothing if not direct. He characterized 
Sandel's stuff as the sort of academic theorizing which has 
nothing much to do with the world, and which is just plain 
wrong. Lapsing right back into the framework of American 
philosophical liberalism, Reinhardt seemed to crash through 
the network of finely outlined distinctions laid by Sandel. He 
seemed a t  first charming but clumsy, blunt, undeterred by 
Sandel's analytical finesse. Yet in his apparent rampage, he 
raised with almost unconscious elegance the main issue, and a 
deeply troubling concrete dilemma. 
* Adjunct Professor, University of Pe~sylvania Law School. My gratitude and 
love go to the community at Pendle Hill Quaker Study Center, where this first 
germinated. 
1. Association of American Law Schools. 
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Reinhardt noted that Sandel's portrait of the person &d 
not work because wTe are not free <md we are not determined, 
but rather arc some mix. His statement of the common sense 
situation of the person was tellingly set in the aegative-he 
resisted saying we are free, because we are not ONLY free. In 
one sense, this concedes much of Sandel's point about the 
inadequacy of the Kantian, Rawlsian unencumbered rational 
self, yet at the same time it reveals Sandel's fatal 
incompleteness. And it focuses, for me, the issue of religious 
freedom in a pcstmodern age. 
To come at this freedom from another angle for a moment, 
I want to  tell the story of Reinhardt's abstraction-resistent 
example. The relationship between conscience and religion, and 
the surrounding issues converge in a case Sandel introduced; 
Reinhardt thought Sandel clearly wrong in his analysis. Sandel 
took a position on Thorton v. Caulder, Inc.? the Connecticut 
Sabbath case. I had thought I agreed with Sandel that the 
Court should give deference to Sabbaths for days off. I agreed 
with his critique of the atomistic, all-choosing individualistic 
language of the Court. Reinhardt put his challenge this way: 
How can we deny the equal rights of atheists who want to take 
a day off when their children are at home? Suddenly, with the 
power of one long-versed in the texture of actual court 
controversies, Reinhardt had moved me, for reasons he did not 
claim, t o  knowing that he was, from my perspective, right. 
Let me try to track his impact on my thought. There is 
something radically important about people's relations with 
their children. As I have a profoundly immanent notion of God, 
I think that much of one's relationship to God is lived out in 
loving one's children, honoring one's parents. I recall an 
obviously substance-influenced young man in Madison 
Wisconsin, one Fourth of July, backing off from a confrontation 
with us older folk, invoking our youngsters, repeating like a 
mantra to  himself and his friends: "Children are sacred." This 
was from someone who loudly held nothing else sacred. His 
chant restored civic order in the park, and gave me some sense 
of the bases for respect which might carry us through a world 
of fractured values. 
Thus, to me Reinhardt's example raised an image of 
something which may "claim" a parent every bit as much as 
2. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
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God claims most of us who believe. Such parental commitment 
to children hardly portrays a "thinly constituted" person. I 
want to honor the role of parent much as  that  of faithful 
believer, I suspect. If the verse in my tradition-that wherever 
your treasure is, there will you find your heart3-is correct, 
each of us has our God, located in that place we find our 
hearts. On what basis would I differentiate profound parental 
fidelity from a more theistic fidelity to a religious tradition? I 
could try to do it facilely, by relying on the patent fact that the 
Constitution was talking about theists when it enumerated the 
right to free exercise, but Employment Division v. Smith4 and 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n5 are now 
precedent, and they too are the law of the land. The very least 
those cases have done is to face us directly into the nexus of 
conscience and religion. 
And Reinhardt's example leaves intact the dilemma about 
freedom and determinism. Do we choose to have children, or is 
that human phenomenon of the propagation of the species, 
highly structured, fully constrained? Is having children a 
matter of conscience? Is Sandel right to use the language of 
"dictates of conscience"? Is non-religious conscience dictated? If 
there is a dictating God, would that coercive discourse not also 
apply to non-theists (I mean, if God is all-powerful, S/He's all- 
powerful whether we believe in Her or not)? If we are claimed 
by God, then, and not free to choose our religious identity, are 
not atheists part of God's plan? Are we not to learn to 
appreciate the serpent, whom God made and set in the garden, 
in my tradition? Which serpents are unacceptable? Sandel of 
course cannot specify--he can only point, as he did at the end 
of his talk, to Judge Frank Johnson and the march on Selma as 
manifestly just. His final move of judgment, is itself bereft of 
analytical elegance. , 
In fact, I think it returns us to Judge Reinhardt's homier 
approach. Sandel liked John'son's judgment, but has no means 
of distinguishing it from the immoral judgment of an immoral 
judge, aside from disagreement over whether his or her cause 
3. Matthew 6:21. 
4. 494 US. 872 (1990) (holding that Free Exercise Clause is not violated when 
state proscribes the use of, and denies unemployment benefits to users of, peyote 
for sacramental purposes). 
5. 485 US. 439 (1988) (holding that Free Exercise Clause does not preclude 
government from permitting road construction and timber harvesting in an area of 
historical religious importance to Native Americans). 
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is just. Reinhardt does not provide such means, either, 
however. He claims neutrality, and that simply is inadequate 
a t  this point in intellectual history as an account of why, as 
Sandel responded after Reinhardt's remarks, Sandel would like 
Reinhardt on the Supreme Court. Sandel liked Reinhardt's 
politics, and so did I. Aside from Reinhardt's manifestation of 
good humor and political compassion, however, Sandel learned 
little from Reinhardt's propositional talk about why Sandel 
found this thickly (in several ways) constituted self so winsome. 
Neither Reinhardt nor Sandel talked about Who or what 
claimed them, or the nature of this most central constituting 
relationship. Sandel lauded Reinhardt's remarks, and called 
Reinhardt to be more explicit in his moral judgments. I went 
up afterwards and lauded Sandel and called him to be more 
explicit in his theological judgments. Because what Sandel 
values is that a person know Who has claimed him, yet he will 
not talk to us about it directly. What he wants to appreciate, 
make visible, foster and then judge in Reinhardt-his 
morality-is SECONDARY yet Sandel hides his own more 
fundamental, pre-social contract stance. 
I t  is not that Sandel's politics might change, or his moral 
appreciation were he to talk of his prior grounding-it is that 
he is hiding his initial commitment in the dialogue. One 
commentator a t  the panel said Rawls' movement into the 
original position was like a monk making such a decision-and 
the simile is radically telling. I t  is precisely that Rawls engages 
in the justice-seeking business to begin with, from an agenda, 
which makes his book work6 . . . without that initial movement 
of commitment to true dialogue, the book would never have 
appeared, nor would his social contract seem plausible. And 
Sandel's passion on the issue of being claimed is his motive 
force, yet he does not open it to the discussion. Paul Ricoeur 
argues that we who believe must willingly suspend such 
commitment in order to enter the public discourse in respect 
for those who are not of our beliefs, even the athei~t'-~et he, 
too, fails to identify that first move as profoundly religious. It is 
not that each should not engage in a new mixed discourse, but 
that if they do so on these grounds, why would they not both 
disclose and name the gift of that movement out of their first 
6. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
7. See PAUL RICOEUR, ONESELF AS ANOTHER 25 (Kathleen Blarney trans., 
1992). 
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language? And should they not say why they trust this 
unknown ground on which they step to have dialogue with the 
Other? 
My concern is not to unveil Sandel-I believe such moves 
must be made by the speaker, the writer himself-but to 
identify what religious liberty means in a world of fluid 
discourse. Our talk in public has been variously characterized 
a s  merging horizons, as an ongoing conversation, as the 
constitution of communities of discourse, as making ourselves 
in our talk, as constructing a social world and as being 
constructed by a social world. What, in this dialogic 
constitutionalism, does religious freedom mean? 
Certainly it cannot be what the Court currently suggests, 
or it is an  empty phrase. That is, something about exercise of 
religion must be more than the freedom to think what one 
wishes. In the traditional liberal worldview, as well as in  
Sandel's, that freedom cannot be extinguished. If what we want 
is to know the phenomenology of the free-thinking slave, 
Epictetus did a decent job of that many centuries ago.' 
However, we purport to be about something more political, 
something which directs or constrains governments. So what is 
my freedom of religion? I want to suggest that it is a right 
which I offer to make most explicitly into a gift. That is, I have 
the right to exercise my religious beliefs, but I want to offer 
something about that right to the public discourse, as a gesture 
of respect. To make it correctly, however, I believe that I must 
make it as a religious statement, and that to do less is to 
diminish both myself and the communities with which I am in 
relation. The gift I want to make is one which enfolds the 
person of conscience within that  sacred Constitutional space 
that tradition has kept for the religious person. I want to 
honor, in my sense and in Sandel's, the person who feels 
himself to be unclaimed by God, the person who knows no 
relationship with God. But I want along the way the chance to 
suggest why neither Sandel's Claimer nor the God whom 
commentators like Iris Murdoch can either support my 
movement of gift, nor be God in a postmodern world. 
Some of you may find the notion that this is a gift, 
offensive. But see it fkom my perspective for a while. I am a 
8. THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS 304-05 (George Long trans., 1920). 
9. See generally IRIS MURDOCH, METAPHYSICS AS A GUIDE TO MORALS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS (1992). 
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theist. I experience a relationship with God, and I hope to 
continue to grow in making i t  central to my life. The invitation 
of this God is to love with my whole mind and heart and soul 
and strength. There is no suggestion that I set Her aside for 
any purpose, including political discourse. Yet S/He has created 
a world in which good people do not know Her by any name 
save the Good, and these are my brothers and sisters. I believe 
that  these persons are in God's image, and are part of a story 
of Good News which at crucial times of belief such as Jesus' 
eating the grilled fish after the Resurrection, includes the truth 
of the verse: " . . . and some doubted."1° There He was, in 
flesh and fish-and some doubted, as the Hebrew psalm- 
writers surely did. Like the serpent, these doubters, internal 
and external, are part of God's creation. I want to honor these 
doubters, but to do so I must first move from where I am, in 
my own voice. If you as fellow-citizen want to claim for your 
conscience what I am guaranteed in the Constitution for mine, 
then listen to why I want to honor your claim. 
Freedom has to do with the law of the unexpected. Holmes 
says that law is about predictability, but part of what law is for 
me is the Unknowable's way, and that is not our way-and yet 
it is. The notion of law as unexpected seems ludicrous in the 
light of law as order, as rule, as certainty. Yet I think of that 
Other side of law, and believe that there is surprise, and unlike 
the old nostrum that one should never ask on cross- 
examination a question without knowing the answer, this is 
about risking such open-ended questioning. 
It is the law we don't already know, which comes without 
warning and reminds us that  we are also free. I suggest that 
this is @t. Let me tell you one of the stories of this, which will 
tell you that this notion of unpredictable law as emergent gift 
is not a cheap notion, for me. 
I am divorced. My son, who is sixteen, lives now with his 
father. This last year and a half, since Ben moved, has been 
profoundly painful for me. I am not wise enough to know which 
portion to relegate to the intrinsic move to separation for any 
sixteen-year-old son, how much to the individual story. The 
10. Matthew 28:17. 
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struggle for me has been to try to give my son all the room I 
can, without guilt or anger (this is my aspiration . . . ). The 
divorce decree stated that visitation with the non-residential 
parent was to be paid for 50-50. I did that all the tough initial 
years, as I drove to where we had all lived even when his 
father did not want to see him because it was too painful to 
reconnect and then let him go back with me. When we set up 
his visit to me at Thanksgiving, and I talked to his father 
about it, there was no issue in my mind; I had six visits ahead, 
and his father owed me many, many trips. 
When I checked about my son's Thanksgiving visit to 
Pendle Hill, the Quaker study and contemplation center near 
Philadelphia at which I am a resident this year, my son had to 
tell me that his father suddenly had no intention of paying his 
share. The court order remains unmodified. I called Ben's 
father, upset that he seemed to  be reverting to  the sort of 
behavior one might understand closer to the rupture of actual 
divorce, but I will tell you that as I first wrote this, I did not 
know if I would see my son for the first time in three months, 
or not. 
I went back to my room, and then in distraction and 
radical frustration, to the bathroom-locking my room door, 
key inside. I had to rouse one of the women on the hall who 
knew where the master key was out in the maintenance 
building, at almost midnight. She trudged over, twice. I was 
furious, rageful that the games of my son's father and my own 
vulnerability led t o  my subconscious's acting out and thus to 
my friend's inconvenience. I said to her that what made me 
angriest was that the impact of his actions was to lead her out 
in the rain in mid-November Pennsylvania. 
The next morning, she was at breakfast. My friend told me 
a story I did not expect. On her trips to maintenance, she 
realized as she passed the pottery studio, that she had left pots 
drymg which if she did not trim would ossify beyond 
redemption. Without my distress, she would have slept through 
the crucial time, and lost all her pots. As it was, she went over 
and rescued them all. 
The notion of karma or dharma, of the way or the law of 
fate, is a sense of the very innards of things, of the workings of 
the threads of necessity and freedom which somehow transcend 
time and are visible to oracles but not to  humans. This is a 
sense of law which hints at determinism, at the idea that if we 
just knew all the variables, we could predictithough we will 
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never know them all. I think there is another notion of law 
here, but one that can be both more creative and more 
liberating than that darkly outlined in Greek tragedy at  first 
reading-because the seeming dark is in fact the holy dark, 
that  without which we cannot be whole, and into which we 
must pass in order to be given and achieve (both) that which 
we most desire. We are constituted by the law, but we also 
make i t  up as we go along. We discover it, and we ALSO create 
it. 
The unraveling and reraveling of this paradox sets the 
context for the interplay between static and dynamic ideas of 
natural law, and between positive and natural law notions. As 
an intuitive model, I would suggest that the speculation about 
genetics gives some hint about this interplay; in linguistic 
terms, I liken it to conversation. True natural law is not a rigid 
pre-determined set of rules in the face of which we are 
ultimately passive, or even a movement towards a dictated 
telos. There is, I suggest, a "law" of the cosmos that reflects 
(with varying degrees of fidelity) into human legal edicts, that 
is not imposed but is both given and improvised. Thus, original 
ideas of DNA were relatively mechanical, constructing double 
helixes which intertwined in beautifid but geometric systems, 
with twenty-three chromosomes from each parent and an 
infinite but somehow theoretically calculable set  of 
combinations. Time revealed those who surmised that genetic 
mutations occurred during the lifetime, so that how we live 
affects those basic building blocks, and thus we change our 
very genetic legacy. "Nature" and "nurture" applied to 
children's growth and also to our own bodies. Much was given; 
much was made; both the given and the made were related to 
one another fundamentally, in intricate daily steps. 
Part of the given is known-and from a different 
perspective, it is also infinitely mysterious, unknown. Often, we 
think of our lives as mostly predictable-we know who our 
family members are, what our socio-economic status is, 
whether we will be fat or thin in five years, what sort of work 
we are likely to be doing, where we will probably live. Even if 
these things are up for grabs, we find a sense of identity, of 
what sort of person each of us is, or is becoming gradually, 
relatively predictable. We think of law in much the same way. 
There might be some changes, but by and large murder will be 
prohibited, some sort of honesty in trade will be regulated 
toward, some degree of regularity in administrative process will 
SURPRISED BY LAW 
be continually elaborated. Jay-walking will not become a 
felony. 
Some areas of law will be more open-ended. Toxic waste 
will continue to battle with common law notions about 
property, as Superfund legislation directed at environmental 
emergency disrupts expectations. But surely we saw the 
environment as the nascent area of crisis legislation many 
years ago. We are surprised when disasters force us to focus, 
but we are looking at something which we have known all 
along a t  some level. And the law is not so unrecognizable from 
the imaginative perspective of those who stood a t  Sinai, once 
we impute to them a real appreciation of changes in  culture 
and technology. The unexpectedness which I want to highlight 
about law is something less about content and "progress" 
naively viewed, than about the interplay between the law as 
"laid down" by the Creator in the blueprint of the world, and 
the law as the lived response of human freedom in that created 
world. (My use of theistic language should not obscure the 
correspondence between a world created and one in which one 
key human enterprise has been to construct/discover the "laws" 
of the universe from a secular-seeming perspective4 am 
simply speaking in my first language to the reader, who may 
process as she is most comfortable.) This is another face of the 
polarity of freedom and fate, framed as an inquiry into what we 
do when we "obey the law." 
The obedience to the law which I suggest is one which 
turns away from the initial connotation which obedience 
conveys now in the twilight of the patriarchy. It is not a 
submission to the law of the father. It is more fundamentally a 
listening. The etymology of "obedience" is "in the way of" (ob-) 
hearing. The word derives from listening, from a stance of 
attentive openness-not from slavish surrender of will or 
internal coercion from childhood dictates. Obedience in this 
guise taps not law's capacity to oblige, but to obligate; this is 
not first the inexorability of law but primarily its song. There 
may seem to be an  aspect of the siren song, the weird cantation 
which compels what we would resist if we but could, a melodic 
necessity which erases freedom. We all have internalized voices 
of authority, inherited more than chosen. I suggest, however, 
that such attention is a listening which is not unilateral in  
either direction-from the father-god to the powerless 
creatures, or from the wholly self-made ubermensch who have 
survived the death of God, shouted defiantly into a universe 
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either empty or constructed solely of our own imagination. 
Rather, this listening comes in something that has the rhythm 
of conversation. It is interactive, relational, always becoming, 
never foreclosing something more, ever open to newness. 
A crucial aspect of this sense of law is time. Time is needed 
in which to tell and live stories, needed to re-member our 
shared stories and new ones coming into being, and to find 
words for the stories' rules. And crucial to time, I will suggest 
along with many contemporary writers, is the practice of 
writing. Thus, the law which I have argued is both written and 
unwritten is always, in my story, moving toward writing. This 
is not to conflate law with writing-rather the opposite-but to 
suggest that it is in the very thing which we often think of as 
giving law its greatest fxity, writing, which may best manifest 
its unexpectedness. 
In my tradition, this should be natural-seeming. After all, 
the "good news" is both new and written. Surely, if Jesus was 
the Son of God and Son of Man [sic], He had to know at some 
level that this would get written down in scripture. In fact, 
that is the very claim of John's "In the beginning was the 
Word. . ."ll which echoes the bereshit of Genesis: "In the 
beginning, God created . . . ."I2 Jesus was a Jew, coming into 
and speaking from within and without, a profoundly written 
tradition, one in which the world is worded into being and 
written in the Book. 
What is, I think, most unexpected, is that we do not only 
listen in obedience, in this conversation of the law. We also 
speak and write. Roberto Unger's classic Knowledge & Politics 
ends with "Speak, God."13 What our traditions say is that God 
has been speaking in creation-and humankind is integral to 
that creation-all along. Yet the speech of God alone would not 
be sufficient. Fate is not mechanical-it is Oedipus' and his 
parents' responses which complete the story. Life cannot be a 
one-sided conversation or ventriloquism. We must speak and 
write our parts. Our speech needs always to attend to 
silence-and when it comes, it must never leave behind the 
silence from which it comes. Yet, finally, we are called upon to 
answer. 
11. John 1:l. 
12. Genesis 1:l. 
13. ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 295 (1975). 
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In C.S. Lewis's Till We Have Faced4 one of the most 
striking things about the woman protagonist's journey is that 
after she has written her complaint, the response is that 
finally, what the heavens have awaited has come-a woman 
has come with complaint. It is not men who concocted the 
patriarchy-it arose out of the human condition which God 
created. Now it is time to complain and to praise. It is time to  
tell the stories Elie Wiesel says God created us to hear (and the 
jokes, I interject). It is time for the law to be spoken as well as 
heard, to be created in conversation which acknowledges "that 
beyond words" yet dares to speak into and from shared silence. 
That is why, even though I know that the Civil Rights Act 
of 196415 included discrimination against anyone based on sex 
because it was a JOKE interjected by a Southern 
congressperson who thought such an addition would scuttle the 
bill, I know that the law can live jokes well, and serve as well 
as oppress. When we hear stories such as that in The 
Brethren,16 which tell of Roe v. Wade's1' getting "on the 
agenda" in a swap for putting on the baseball free agents' case, 
we should hazard the laugh which such double irony invites. 
The hidden jokes, the story in perspective, can be stunning. 
But let me tell you what scares me about this unexpected, 
unpredictable power of law most of all. It is a fear so elemental 
that it predates civil law, moves across cultures, lives in 
humankind's hidden recesses. It is called various things, but 
most commonly the law of return. 
I remember my client who was a member of Wicca, and of 
the Covenant of the Goddess, a benign pagan nature religion. 
Her children were taken from her because of the fear of the 
social workers; finally even the Native American shaman's son 
laid a hawk feather on her doorstep and went back to  tell his 
office mates she was a Satan worshiper. They put her children 
in fundamentalist Christian homes. She kept telling me about 
the law of return: what goes around, comes around. She 
crossed paths with another client, who eventually went to  trial. 
The second client had been selected when she was sixteen for 
14. C.S. LEWIS, TILL WE HAVE FACES: A MYTH RETOLD (1956). 
15. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-17 
(1988)). 
16. BOB WOODWARD & &XYIT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: I SIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT (1979). 
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
158 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
the attentions of the president of the Junior Chamber of 
Commerce, then thirty-four with three children and wife. After 
he waited until two days after her statutory rape birthday to 
seduce her, he took graphic pictures of her on site at his 
business, a pizza chain. They had a child. He moved on to 
another woman after using my client's short-lived but 
spectacular physical beauty. When the stories came out in the 
papers, the case was wild and notorious, and my Wicca client 
saw the understory right away. 'What goes around, comes 
around," she said, especially as she learned how the judge 
threw out our pleadings on the most outrageous pretexts; our 
main cause of action, negligent infliction of emotional harm, he 
deemed excluded because HIS NOTES of the pretrial 
conference did not detail it, although the pleadings did. The 
judge was weary, sodden, manipulable by the bullying male 
attorneys who overtly approached him ex parte and bragged of 
it. He ruled with complete abandon, complete lack of precedent 
or law. We went to the jury without the main evidence (the 
pictures), the crucial law (the multiple criminal statutes the 
defendant had breached), and the cause of action on which we 
had a prayer. "What goes around. . . " our older, more 
seasoned client intoned. 
The day after the two-week trial ended, the judge went on 
a bike trip. He skidded down a hill and spent six weeks in 
intensive care from which no one expected him to emerge. He 
lived, but never presided over another day of court. 
I am frightened of the power of that punitive-seeming law 
of return. It threatens. It seems to say that the dictum that "by 
the same measure with which you give out, you will re~eive,"'~ 
is a rigid reflection of your soul. All you have been given, for 
good or ill, is of your own making. You are what you have done. 
It makes no sense at a distance: Somali children cannot 
have given out the measure of starvation. Victims have not 
done what is done to them. All is not deserved. But there is 
that insinuation, that suggestion that law is in fact something 
which levels as a bomb levels, annihilates, punishes. This is 
the accusation which Job resisted, and which the story of 
Jesus-executed as a criminal-says is a lie. Yet what is this 
law of return, and what is the nature of things, the law of 
human good and evil? 
18. Matthew 7:2. 
SURPRISED BY LAW 
My suggestion is this: I t  is a law in the making. It is not 
ended with Josef K. in Kafka's The  rial'^; law is not only the 
faceless bureaucratic charge of our ubiquitous guilt. More than 
that (for law is that harshness, also), true law is open. It is the 
answer which Josef makes through Franz, who writes of it. 
Franz Kafka's writing about writing is compelling, telling of 
writing to live, of writing as life, for him. He writes of a world 
in which Josef is trapped under law-but the author and the 
reader are not trapped. The author and reader are in 
conversation, and they do not accept the law as The Trial 
portrays it. Kafka enacts the law as inexorable, tells its dark 
secret, and thus renders it unacceptable. He frees himself in  
telling the reader, and the reader in reading the text accepts 
this urge beyond condemnation. Our participation in his text, 
our rejection of anonymous guilt, moves the law through and 
beyond what modern bureaucratic numbing has let it become. 
Kafka writes the story of unredeemed law, he writes himself 
free, and we may respond with him, in redemptive insistence 
on something more. 
If law is not solely inexorable, what is it? I suggest that it 
is always moving toward newness. Perhaps it does not move at 
the pace many of us would want, but that joke in the Congress 
almost thirty years ago made it the law that women and people 
of color and believers could not be treated as they had been 
without legal consequences. That is not a vacuous moment in 
history, that joke. At times it has relapsed into empty promise, 
but a t  times it has told law firms that partnership decisions 
are under the law, and even the hugest of the legal 
establishment's bastions must navigate the waters of the Civil 
Rights Act. Sometimes such laws touch hearts. Sometimes they 
even touch minds. Sometimes they finally convince detractors 
that it's just plain easier in the end to take the laws seriously 
than to engage in elaborate pretexts, as Aristotle said that to 
lie took a smarter person than he was. 
And so it is that we do not only listen for the law. We also 
try to speak it. That is sometimes what I find most 
unexpected-or, rather, not that  we speak, but that  somehow 
after that audacity, God, the Other, listens. 
What comes of this listening God? This is the retelling of 
the story which transforms fate. Suppose we are fated to marry 
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our mothers or fathers, and kill the other parent? Suppose that 
Freud has simply made more subtle what Oedipus lived and 
Sophocles recorded? If there is to law that which is given, not 
to be changed in itself, may the given not change by how it is 
lived, by the texture of the story? One aspect of this freedom 
from fate is in Oedipus' story? the oracle says that the city 
which is home to Oedipus when he dies will fare well. That city 
might have been Thebes, need not have been Argos. The 
oracle's story includes freedom within it. When Dylan Thomas 
says that "time held me green and dying, and I sang in my 
chains like the sea" it is the song which counts, and the singing 
transforms the very chains. 
A different aspect of freedom's dance with fate, with law as 
given, is that suggested to me by Juliana of Norwich's full 
meditation, usually quoted only partially: Sin is necessary, but 
all shall be well, and all shall be well, and all manner of thing 
shall be well.21 The fact of t h  fated transgressions is not a22 
the story. The law of the oracle, of our legacies, of what the 
Creator has made, is not all there is. We are also authors, co- 
creators, law-crafters, story-tellers. And we are not alone, just 
the individual with God the Father. God is more mysterious 
than that, and we are more multiple, more connected, more in 
flux together. It is given that we must die, but what we do with 
that law is all of a life full of the unexpected. 
My suspicion-and as it is one of life's true mysteries, that 
is all it can be: a suspicion, like one of Socrates' myths 
punctuating his "rational" dialogues a t  points which will 
sustain no more such "reason7'-is that the reason for the 
unexpected is that God gave us law to make us free. Law is the 
last outpost before the abyss, and the first oasis beyond it, but 
the leap through the void is where love truly grows real. 
Catharine MacKinnon has portrayed the effects of power, 
dominance, on what we call love. When there is an imbalance 
of coercive power, then love is never fully free. God the Father 
cannot feel very well-cherished by adults, so long as the law is 
punitive and inexorable. But set us free, loose those chains so 
that we can if we choose say yes or no to true relationship with 
One made equal by neediness like our own, and our yes is love 
20. SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS THE KING (Peter D. Arnott trans., Hilan Davidson 
1960). 
21. See JULIAN OF NORWICH: SHOWINGS 225 (Edmund Colledge & James Walsh 
trans., 1978). 
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given freely to the Other. If there is a law of love, it cannot 
command, nor is it a matter of obedience to the Father or the 
state. We have grown so used to a law of calculation and 
retribution and raw obedience, however, that  a law of love and 
conversation still comes as radically unexpected. 
Now, in the back of my mind, ranging about like one of 
Patricia Williams' polar bears just out of inner sight, is Judge 
Reinhardt. If he found Sandel out to lunch, what would he 
make of this patently spiritual stuff? I suspect that at this 
juncture in the history of American culture, it would depend if 
the conversation were considered "public" or "private." In so- 
called "public" discourse, the penchants of the judge are 
irrelevant, according to his version of neutrality. But in 
"private," I suspect that he might well be like the judge for 
whom I clerked when I finished law school. My judge would 
talk of his final grounding from time to time, in his soft, even 
voice, especially a t  the dinner the former clerks give him every 
year. It wasn't so much denominational-he did not refer to the 
Presbyterian church which had since reinstated him on its 
board of elders after kicking him off as he desegregated the 
schools in the late sixties-as it was Biblical. I t  would be the 
kind of quiet statement of fidelity to God's love and justice 
which only a full evening of table fellowship could truly 
sustain. It was in a gathering of friends, a time of communion 
and rememberance. Direct references to God were circumspect 
and often wry in his opinions, and rare. Yet his fidelity was 
clear and consistent, even when twelve years after the 
controversial bussing orders, his windshield was shattered the 
night a movie about bussing was on national TV. My judge 
lived and worked in a very real world, one in which his 
children were threatened for his actions, his f iends turned 
their backs literally, and he endured threats of what Julius 
Chambers, the plaintiffs' attorney underwent-fuebombing- 
for actions Sandel would find as courageous and just as Frank 
john son'^.^^ And he knew that the only way to live the 
courage which law required was in the freedom of God's love. 
The gift which I propose in theory, one of expanding what the 
22. See supra p. 149 (referring to Frank Johnson). 
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Constitution makes sacred for religion into the realm of 
"secular" conscience so that what we know as religious liberty 
a t  its best will belong to us all, is one I saw him extend in his 
courtroom to atheists, Muslims, prisoners, social security 
disability aspirants, ingrates and illiterates. What he extended 
was more than basic human respect, more than a formal 
constitutional right, and no less than holding the difficult 
balance of the individual and corporate conscience when in 
tension with the demands of the state. He did it because we are 
all God's creatures. Someday I'd like to have a conversation 
with Reinhardt about that, and Sandel, and call them both to 
tell their stories as part of fuller accounts of making judgments 
in  law. 
However, they are not here, and you are. So I call on you 
to lift the corner of the self-censoring which brackets the 
spiritual in your scholarship, scholarship which is often 
passionately motivated by things which touch on the numinous. 
As Sandel wants the community's discourse to be enriched by 
the moral, I want it liberated by the spirit. For some of you, 
this might involve lapsing into talk which is not so fluent for 
you as your academic language. For some, it may seem 
hopelessly private or inchoate. Those who find themselves to be 
"hopeful agnostics" for example, may wonder what of value is 
to be said. I can't know, but I do believe, that what is to be said 
can be diflicult, whole, risky, wonderful, liberating and most 
unexpected. I believe that such talk in all its plurality and 
ambiguity, even if halting a t  first, will not only set the speaker 
free, but also make true religious liberty more likely in its 
institutional and its community identities. 
